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Key points
- The idea that emotions are unhelpful, especially with decision-making, has long been popular.
- Seemingly originating from Plato, the idea is being increasingly challenged.
- Emotions play a role in decision-making and moral decision-making; this can be distinctly positive.
- Some even argue that emotions are what drive moral decision-making with rationality applied retrospectively.
Many of us have heard the words “stop being so emotional” at times in our lives. Some of us have heard these words often. While they might represent great advice at certain moments, underlying them is an idea that goes beyond the moments when the words are appropriate—such as in the heat of an overreaction—and extends to a generalized suspiciousness of emotions as a whole. Behind these words is the view that emotions are fundamentally suspect, and perhaps even that they are inherently problematic.
Where did this idea originate? While that question demands writings of its own, a sound case is made that this is an idea that was popularized by Plato, before being boosted during the Enlightenment (Williams, 1998), and then again by Freud (Giner-Sorolla, 2018). While it is unwise to dismiss all of Plato’s ideas simply because he heralds from a different age, it would be unequally unwise to not have challenged them, particularly aided by the benefits of since accumulated knowledge, and especially the scientific findings of the last few centuries.
Plato’s derision of emotions has been taken up by significant thinkers over the ages, such as Immanuel Kant, and more recently, John Rawls.
Emotions can be many things, the delineations of which are still being debated; an emotional reaction can be anything from tugs of empathy on seeing someone in need, or to readying oneself to flee from a potentially life-threatening situation to reflecting on a painful mistake committed years ago. Given the range of functions and applications, any blanket statement to the effect of “emotions are bad” or even the more nuanced “emotional reactions are usually unhelpful” is difficult to defend.
While the benefits of emotions enjoy a considerable range, especially when considering certain “moral emotions,” such as gratitude and compassion, and even guilt and (arguably) shame, let's reflect on how emotions can aid in moral judgment.
Emotions and Control
Of the contributors, the derision of emotions is the idea that they descend upon us and we have no control over them. While this might be true of certain aspects of emotions, such as fight-or-flight readiness, or the initial stage of an overwhelming wave of sadness, the idea that we have no say in how our emotions are experienced is increasingly challenged.
Ben-Ze’ev (1997) reminds his readers that emotions often contain intentional components that we can control, while Zaki’s (2018) work on empathy shows that we often play a significant role in who gets our empathy and who does not. While Zaki’s findings come with a warning against seeing empathy as an objective force for good, the underlying idea that we have a degree of control over where our emotions can be channeled is important to the discussion at hand.
Emotions and Moral Motivation
The work of Prinz and Nichols (2010) is also useful in this conversation. They make a strong case for the role that emotions play in moral motivation. Motivation is one facet of the function of emotions, so it stands to reason that they will also play an important role in motivating moral motivation, and moral behaviour beyond that.
Emotions and Moral Focus
Another facet to the function of emotions is allowing us to focus on what is important, be that a threatening stimulus in our immediate presence, or when reflecting on how we are doing in terms of living the life we want to live. Prinz and Nichols (2010) again see emotions serving us as we develop our moral epistemology and decide what is morally important, and what is not.
Emotions and Moral Judgement
Some theories see emotions as playing a significant role in moral judgments. Some theories see emotions as sometimes playing a small role in moral judgment, but as being important for moral action (Prinz & Nichols, 2010). Other theories, such as Haidt's (2001), argue that emotions lead the way to moral judgment, with reasoning being applied retrospectively.
This is quite the distance from Plato and his rationalist approach that proposes that moral judgment is driven by reason, with emotions arising as a by-product, and a warning against letting emotions drive moral judgment. While those such as Thomas (1998) see the Enlightenment as amplifying Plato’s push for rationalism and logic, Prinz (2013) makes the case that some of the minds behind the Scottish variant (i.e. the Scottish Enlightenment), such as David Hume and Adam Smith, were prone to Sentimentalism, which affords emotions a key role in moral decision making.
So the next time someone tells you to “stop being so emotional,” you can retort with a cool, “Well, let us define what we mean by emotional first.” Being emotional might be conducive to being moral. While it is not always going to be positive or healthy to be in a highly emotional state, the idea that any expression of emotion is necessarily bad is just as untrue.
References
Giner-Sorolla, R. (2018). A functional conflict theory of moral emotions. In K. Gray & J. Graham (Eds.), Atlas of Moral Psychology. The Guilford Press: New York.
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108(4). https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814
Prinz, J. J., & Nichols, S. (2010). Moral emotions. In The moral psychology handbook. (pp. 111–146). Oxford University Press: Oxford. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.003.0005
Williams, S. J. (1998). Modernity and the emotions: Corporeal reflections on the (IR)rational. Sociology, 32(4). https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038598032004007
Ben-Ze’ev, A. (1997). Emotions and morality. In Journal of Value Inquiry. 195(2). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004236823330
Zaki, J. (2017). Empathy is a Moral Force. In K. Gray & J. Graham (Eds.), Atlas of Moral Psychology. The Guilford Press: New York.
Prinz, J. J. (2013). Constructive Sentimentalism: legal and political implications. Nomos, 53, 3–18. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24220327
